After Nonconcepts

Chapter 2b on Nonconceptual Content

In the second half of chapter 2, Jerry Fodor responds to arguments for nonconceptual contents (read: a way of representing the world without meeting conditions for concept, a normative condition for intentional mental states including structure, compositionality, internal consistency, determinateness, abstract, categorization and belief. Nonconceptual content as a mental state, of course, opposes the Theory of Ideas that Fodor so dearly loves. The reason for this being - if nonconceptual content is within the bounds of thought, then thought is governed by the immaterial as well as the material.

Fodor lists three cases for nonconceptual content. The second, on phenomenal experience, is/was my personal objection.

Belief Independence Argument:

P(1): Concepts are belief-based.
P(2): Informational states are independent from belief.
C: Therefore, informational states are nonconceptual.

Fodor responds: Informational states do not constitute thought. So while informational states are nonconceptual, thought is not constituted by nonconceptual content. Fodor thus appeases the proof against him and eats his cake as well. Fodor lists a dot-psychology test from the 1970's as strong evidence. We will not get into that here.

Enrichment Argument:

P(1): Our phenomenal experience has more content than is/can be determinately identified.
C: Therefore, our phenomenal experience has nonconceptual content.

Fodor responds: Quite simply, nonconceptual content can be determinately identified demonstratively.

Continuity Argument:

P(1): Adult humans and non-linguistic animals share the same content.
P(2): Adult humans have beliefs but animals do not.
C: Therefore, adult humans and animals share content that does not require beliefs.

For this final argument Fodor has no response. Well, I lied, Fodor has no immediate response. In fact, the rest of the book is a response to this argument and for that you will have to wait until next time.